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THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF 
M Y  LAI: A TIME TO INCULCATE 
THE LESSONS 
MAJOR JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT* 
MAJOR WILLIAM A. HUDSON, JR.** 
I. Introduction 
The way of  the superior m a n  is like that of  the 
archer. When he misses the center of the target he turns 
and seeks the cause of his failure in himselrl 
If history teaches anything about avoiding the mistakes and 
disasters of the past, it is that humanity first must understand 
historical lessons-lessons often understood only after the expen- 
diture of incredible amounts of human blood and treasure-and 
then must inculcate those lessons in the members of each of its 
succeeding generations. 
As America passes the second anniversary of its victory in 
the Persian Gulf War,2 correctly having heeded the lessons of 
appeasement from World War II,3 another reminder of critical 
historical lessons is rapidly approaching. Spring 1993 marks the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the My Lai massacre-an appropriate 
time to revisit the event and to reinforce the lessons learned. 
Representing the antithesis of the conduct of United States 
Armed Forces during the Liberation and Defense of Kuwait, the 
My Lai massacre was a nightmarish event that most Americans 
would like to forget. Nevertheless, My Lai never must be forgotten. 
Its horror and disgrace are precisely why My Lai must never be 
erased from the individual memories of American citizens, nor 
must it ever be lost from the legacy of the United States. To the 
contrary, nothing provides a greater vehicle for inculcating the 
~ ~ 
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'CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 59 (Arthur Waley trans., 1939). 
2See Michael Cramer, Kuwait: Back to the Past, TIME, Aug. 5, 1991, a t  33. 
The ground phase of the military campaign in the Persian Gulf War lasted only 
100 hours, from 24 to 28 February 1991. For an excellent overview of the entire 
operation, see The Gulf War, MIL. REV., Sept. 1991. 
3See THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (Jan. 
1992). 
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necessity for strict adherence to the law of war than the lessons 
from the massacre at My Lai. From its engagements in Grenada in 
1983, to Panama in 1989, to Kuwait in 1991, the United States 
military can take full credit for its commendable record in adhering 
to the law of war largely because of its commitment to institutional- 
izing the lessons learned from My Lai. Accordingly, every American 
soldier must understand the significance of the My Lai massacre 
and steadfastly must keep it in the forefront of his or  her conscious. 
11. The Massacre at  My Lai 
A. An Emblem of Shame 
Every army has its own mythology, its symbols of heroism, 
and its symbols of shame. The Army of the United States is no 
exception. In the sphere of heroism, the American military has an 
incredible reservoir of noble and fantastic figures to draw from- 
men whose military proficiency and ethical conduct in combat 
have maintained an impeccable American reputation for both 
battlefield excellence and strict adherence to the laws regulating 
warfare.4 More than any other army in modern history, the 
American Army is able to claim proudly as its own some of the 
greatest soldiers in the history of warfare. 
Unfortunately, the United States military also has its figures 
of shame, soldiers who have engaged in blatant violations of the 
most fundamental and civilized rules regulating behavior in 
combat.5 While American misconduct is certainly an aberration 
and not the norm, that does not lessen the severity of the shame. 
Without question, each and every grave breach6 of the law of war 
represents a horrible scar on the credibility of the American 
military, as well as the civilized democracy it protects. 
In this context, the greatest emblem of American military 
shame in the twentieth century occurred during the Vietnam 
War-a war few Americans yet understand.7 While American 
troops were involved in several cases of unlawful killings of 
4Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm, R.E. Lee or W.T. Sherman? 
136 MIL. L. REV. 115 (1992) (arguing that General R. E. Lee set such a standard 
for the United States military). 
51d. (pointing out the war crimes of General William T. Sherman during the 
Civil War). 
‘See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
7See, e.g., THE VIETNAM DEBATE (John Norton Moore ed., 1990); JOHN 
NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972). An entire series of myths 
has persisted over the Vietnam War. These myths commonly have covered issues 
such as the lawfulness of the American intervention, the nature and purpose of 
the Communist Party in North Vietnam, and the reasons for the failure of the 
United States to carry the war into North Vietnam to win a military victory. 
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unarmed civilians during the Indo-China War, by far the most 
violent-and hence the most infamous-of these incidents has 
come to be called the My Lai massacre. 
Any discussion of the American violations of the law of war 
during Vietnam in general, and at My Lai in particular, must be 
viewed against the background of the enemy’s activities. In this 
context, American violations absolutely pale in comparison to the 
many thousands of command-directed slaughters that were 
committed by the communist regime of North Vietnam. Accord- 
ingly, though the incident was not atypical of the war in general, 
the My Lai massacre certainly can be characterized as an 
aberration with respect to the American presence in Vietnam. 
The American record in Vietnam with regard to  
observance of the law of war is not a succession of war 
crimes and does not support charges of a systematic 
and willful violation of existing agreements for stand- 
ards of human decency in time of war, as many critics 
of the American involvement have alleged. Such 
charges were based on a distorted picture of the actual 
battlefield situation, on ignorance of existing rules of 
engagement, and on a tendency to  construe every mis- 
take of judgement as a wanton breach of the law of 
war.8 
In contrast, blatant violations of numerous provisions of the 
law of war-including murder, torture, and intimidation-were 
the modus operandi for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
Army.9 In one scholar’s estimate, North Vietnam sponsored the 
slaughter of over one and a quarter million of its own people from 
1945 to 1987.10 Included in this figure, since the fall of South 
Vietnam in 1975, are over 250,000 Vietnamese “boat people” as 
well as 250,000 other civilians who either were slaughtered 
ruthlessly outright or perished in communist death camps created 
to “re-educate” noncommunists.11 These massive crimes never 
have been punished, much less acknowledged forcefully by human 
rights groups. “In sum, re-education was a label for revenge, 
punishment, and social prophylaxes. But unlike the Khmer Rouge 
who were too public about their mass killing, the Vietnamese 
regime cleverly and at first hid it from the outside world.”12 
‘R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT: GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript a t  31, on file with 
author). 
’See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
~ORUMMEL, supra note 8, manuscript at 1. 
”Id. at 48-52. 
I2Id. at  46. 
156 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139 
The enemy’s barbaric conduct should offer little solace to the 
American conscience in the wake of My Lai. The record of 
misconduct amassed by the communists in no way justifies what 
occurred at My Lai; nevertheless, it helps to place the American 
violations in a real-world perspective. For North Vietnam, the 
strategy for a communist victory intentionally was predicated on 
terror and propaganda; for the United States, the massacre a t  My 
Lai was an  unfortunate contradiction. 
B. The Facts of My Lai 
The hard facts relating to the My Lai massacre are now 
fairly certain, thanks to a thorough criminal investigation aimed 
at  the perpetrators of the crime and a collateral administrative 
investigation ordered by the Secretary of the Army and headed by 
Lieutenant General W. R. Peers.13 Despite an initial cover-up by 
some of those associated with the crime, the enormity of the 
atrocity diminished the likelihood that it long could be kept 
secret. Nevertheless, for well over a year, the general public knew 
nothing of the incident.14 
On March 16, 1968, an American combat task force of the 
23d Infantry Division (the America1 Division)l5 launched an 
airmobile assault into the village complex of Son My in the 
province of Quang Ngai, South Vietnam. Like all such operations, 
the attack was executed only after the commander of the task 
force, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, had assembled his key 
junior commanders for a final review of the details of the combat 
operation. This briefing, which took place on March 15, 1968, 
involved discussions on the positioning of helicopters, the conduct 
of artillery preparation, and the specific assignments of the three 
companies that comprised what became known as Task Force 
“Barker.” While the other two companies provided blocking and 
support functions, Charlie Company, commanded by Captain 
1 3 W ~ ~ ~ ~  R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY (1979) [hereinafter PEERS 
REPORT]. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 
issued a joint directive for Lieutenant General William R. Peers to  explore the 
original Army investigations of what had occurred on March 16, 1968, in Son My 
Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. This investigation became 
known as  the Peers Report. Specifically, General Peers was tasked to determine 
the following: (1) the adequacy of such investigations or inquiries and subsequent 
reviews and reports within the chain of command; and (2) whether any 
suppression or withholding of information by persons involved in the incident had 
taken place. See also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS 
COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF LAW? 29 (1976). 
I4For an excellent discussion of the initial breaking of the story see William 
Wilson, I Prayed to God That This Thing Was Fiction . . . , AMER. HERITAGE, Feb. 
1990, a t  44. 
I5Id. The troops making up the task force were from the 1st Battalion, 20th 
Infantry, 11th Light Infantry Brigade. 
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Ernest Medina, would take the primary responsibility for battling 
any enemy resistance encountered in the village. 
At the briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Barker reminded his 
commanders that intelligence reports had indicated that the 
village complex was a staging area for the 48th Viet Cong local 
force battalion and that the Americans could expect an  enemy 
force of up to 250 soldiers.16 Accordingly, the American soldiers 
anticipated that they would be outnumbered by the enemy. Still, 
having yet t o  engage any enemy forces in direct combat, Task 
Force Barker saw the operation as an opportunity finally to fight 
the ever-elusive Viet Cong in the open.17 
The intelligence on a large enemy force, however, proved to 
be incorrect. When the American combat forces landed, they soon 
found that the village was occupied almost totally by noncomba- 
tants.18 Although the civilians offered no resistance whatsoever, 
some of the members of Charlie Company went on a command- 
directed killing spree. Under the direct supervision of several 
company grade officers-First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., 
being the most notorious-American troops murdered well over 
200 unarmed South Vietnamese civilians.19 
The largest killing of civilians occurred in the hamlet of My 
Lai, known to the Americans by the nickname of “Pinkville,” 
which was part of the Son My complex. The murdered consisted 
primarily of women, children, and old men; some were shot in 
small groups, others were fired upon as they fled. At My Lai, 
most of the civilians methodically had been herded into groups 
and then gunned down. The largest group was killed under the 
direct supervision of Lieutenant Calley.20 
1 6 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  47. Total enemy strength in Quang Ngai 
Province in  the spring of 1968 was thought to  be between 10,000 and 14,000 men. 
I7GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, a t  492. The Son My area had been the 
scene of numerous incidents in which many Americans had been killed or 
wounded by booby traps and snipers during the few months prior to the My Lai 
incident. Charlie Company had lost two dead and 13 wounded in a minefield on 
February 25, 1968. On March 14, 1968, a popular sergeant had been killed and 
three other soldiers wounded, by a booby trap. In total, Charlie Company had lost 
20 soldiers killed or wounded in the Son My area. 
“Id. a t  103. The Peers Report made the following finding on enemy 
combatants: “The evidence indicates that only three or four were confirmed as  
Viet Cong, although there were undoubtedly several unarmed Viet Cong men, 
women and children among them and many more active supporters and 
sympathizers . . . .” Id. 
”Although the official count of the dead was 175, this figure was certainly 
low. The dead may have reached almost 400. Id. a t  1, 314. But see George Esper, 
Twenty Years Later, My  Lai Remains a Symbol of Shame, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
1988, a t  2A; RUMMEL, supra note 8, manuscript a t  32 (putting the figure at  347). 
The current communist regime in Vietnam has erected a plaque in My Lai with 
the names of 540 men, women, and children listed as dying in the massacre. 
2 o B ~ t  see infra note 31. 
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In addition to the unlawful killing of civilians, the soldiers 
destroyed most of the homes and killed most of the domestic 
animals in the village.21 Several cases of rape also were reported 
to have taken place during the massacre.22 When it was over, the 
statistics told the story: one American soldier in Charlie Company 
had been wounded by friendly fire23 and hundreds of South 
Vietnamese women, children, and elderly men were dead. 
Perhaps the only redeeming aspect of the incident was the 
fact that some of the American solders either had refused to 
participate24 or  openly had attempted to halt the killings. Chief 
Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson, Jr., was one of those who 
took specific actions to halt the killings. Tasked with piloting one 
of the helicopters during the operation, Chief Thompson testified 
that he noticed large numbers of “wounded and dead civilians 
everywhere.”25 Assuming that the Americans on the ground 
would assist those who were wounded, which was the standard 
procedure, Chief Thompson began to mark the location of the 
wounded Vietnamese civilians with smoke canisters as he flew 
overhead. To his horror, he witnessed the exact opposite. Drawn 
to the smoke, American soldiers were shooting the wounded that 
Chief Thompson had marked so accurately. Still only partially 
realizing the full impact of what was happening on the ground, 
Chief Thompson immediately headed his helicopter into My Lai, 
and landed near a large drainage ditch filled with dead and dying 
civilians. As he began to assist the Vietnamese who were still 
alive, Lieutenant Calley and a handful of troops approached. 
When Chief Thompson asked for assistance in caring for the 
civilians, Lieutenant Calley clarified his intentions to kill the 
remaining noncombatants. Chief Thompson recalled that Lieuten- 
ant Calley said of the civilians, “The only way you’ll get them out 
is with a hand grenade.”26 Instead of backing down from the clear 
21See PEERS REPORT, supra note 13, a t  277. The report from the Son My 
Village Chief, dated March 22, 1968, indicated that 90% of the animals and 
houses as destroyed. 
”See Esper, supra note 19; GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at  343. The 
Peers Report made the following specific findings in reference to one platoon 
leader, Lieutenant Steven K. Brooks: “Although he knew that a number of his 
men habitually raped Vietnamese women in villages during operations, on 16 
March 1968, he observed, did not prevent, and failed to report several rapes by 
members of his platoon while in My Lai , . . on 16 March.” 
23See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, a t  493. The single casualty probably 
was a self-inflicted gun shot wound by one of the members of Company C who was 
seeking to avoid participation in the operation. 
24See Wilson, supra note 14, a t  49. One of the soldiers who had refused to  
participate was Sergeant Michael Bernhardt. Sergeant Bernhardt, however, did 
not attempt to  halt his fellow soldiers from the killings. He stated, “It was point 
blank murder, and I was standing there watching it.” Id.  
251d. at  50. 
261d. 
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designs of a superior officer, however, Chief Thompson quickly 
ordered his M60 machine gunner, Private First Class Lawrence 
Colburn, to open fire on the United States soldiers if they came 
any closer t o  the remaining civilians. Chief Thompson then placed 
all the civilians he could on his helicopter and ferried them to  
safety. 
C. My Lai Comes to Light 
The initial attempts t o  cover up the crime could not quell the 
nightmares of those who had witnessed the slaughter. Rumors of 
the massacre persisted, coming to  a boiling point when an ex- 
serviceman named Ron Ridenhour sent a second-hand account of 
the massacre to President Richard Nixon, “twenty three members 
of Congress, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Secretary of 
the Army, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”27 
Ridenhour had written a four-page letter that chronicled detailed 
information from several of the soldiers who either had taken 
part in the bloody massacre or had witnessed it first hand. The 
letter read in part as follows: 
It was late in April, 1968 that I first heard of 
“Pinkville” [(My Lai)]. . . . It was in the end of June, 
1968 when I ran into Sargent [sic] Larry La Croix at  
the US0 in Chu Lai. La Croix had been in 2nd Lt. 
Kally’s [sicl platoon on the day Task Force Barker 
swept through “Pinkville.” What he told me verified the 
stories of the others, but he also had something new to  
add. He had been a witness t o  Kally’s [sic] gunning 
down of a t  least three separate groups of villagers. “It 
was terrible. They were slaughtering the villagers like 
so many sheep.” Kally’s [sicl men were dragging people 
out of bunkers and hootches and putting them together 
in a group. The people in the group were men, women 
and children of all ages. As soon as he felt that the 
group was big enough, Kally [sicl ordered an M-60 
(machine gun) set up and the people killed. La Croix 
said he bore witness to this procedure a t  least three 
times. . . .  This account of Sargent La Croix confirmed 
the rumors that Gruver, Terry and Doherty had 
previously told me about Lieutenant Kally [sicl . . . . I 
have considered sending this to newspapers, magazines, 
and broadcasting companies, but I somehow feel that 
investigation and action by the Congress of the United 
States is the appropriate procedure. . . .28 
271d. at 46. 
2 8 G ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ET AL., supra note 13, at 36. 
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Ron Ridenhour’s letter received prompt attention both in the 
media and in the legislative and executive branches of the federal 
government. The initial military reaction was one of disbelief. No 
one believed that a massacre of that magnitude could have been 
committed by American soldiers or that the massacre “could have 
remained hidden for so long.”29 
As the horrible truth of the crime came to light, however, the 
Army quickly launched the comprehensive Peers Commission 
investigation, popularly known as the Peers Report.30 At the 
same time, the general public tasted the horror of the My Lai 
massacre through a series of gruesome photographs of the dead, 
which had been taken by a former Army photographer named 
Ronald Haeberle. The color photographs appeared in the Decem- 
ber 1969 issue of Life magazine. 
D. The Impact of My Lai 
Charges were preferred against four officers31 and nine 
enlisted men32 for their involvements in the My Lai massacre. In 
“PEERS REPORT supra note 13, at  7; see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,  supra note 
13, at  274-75. The Army knew that the communists had reported the alleged 
killing of civilians a t  My Lai, but the reports largely were ignored, in keeping 
with the common communist technique of outrageous propaganda. One notice that 
was captured in late March 1968 was entitled “Concerning Crimes Committed by 
US Imperialists and Their Lackeys Who Killed More Than 500 Civilians at  Tinh 
Khe Village (Son My), Son Tinh District.” It stated the following: 
Xam Lang (Thuan Yen) Subhamlet of Tu Cung Hamlet and 
Xom Go Subhamlet of Co Luy were pounded by artillery for hours. 
After shelling, nine helicopters landed troops who besieged the two 
small hamlets, killing and destroying. They formed themselves into 
three groups: one group was in charge of killing civilians, one group 
burned huts, and the third group destroyed vegetation and trees and 
killed animals. Wherever they went, civilians were killed, houses and 
vegetation were destroyed and cows, buffalo, chickens, and ducks 
were also killed. They even killed old people and children: pregnant 
women were raped and killed. This was by far the most barbaric 
killing in human history. 
30See PEERS REPORT, supra note 13; supra text accompanying note 13. 
3 1 T ~ o  ther key officers involved in the massacre, Lieutenant Steven 
Brooks and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, had been killed in Vietnam before 
the formal investigation into My Lai had begun. The Peers Report found that 
Lieutenant Brooks had “directed and supervised the men of his platoon in the 
systematic killing of a t  least 60-70 noncombatants in the subhamlets of My Lai 
and Binh Tay.” The Peers Report also found that Colonel Barker had been 
involved in the cover-up of the massacre. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at  
343. The officers charged with murder were Captain Ernest L. Medina, Captain 
Eugene M. Kotouc, First Lieutenant William L. Calley, J r . ,  and First Lieutenant 
Thomas K. Willingham. See Peers Report, supra note 13, at  227. 
32The enlisted men charged with murder were Sergeant Kenneth L. Hodges, 
Sergeant Charles E. Hutton, Sergeant David Mitchell, Sergeant Escquiel Torres, 
Specialist Four William F. Doherty, Specialist Four Robert W. TSouvas, Corporal 
Kenneth Schiel, Private Max Hutson, and Private Gerald A. Smith. See PEERS 
REPORT, supra note 13, at  227. 
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addition, twelve other officers were charged with military offenses 
associated with the cover-up.33 Of these twenty-five accused 
soldiers, only Lieutenant William Calley was convicted.34 The 
other officers and enlisted men either successfully moved to  have 
the charges against them dismissed or were found not guilty at 
their courts-martial. 
Tried before a military panel composed of six officers, 
Lieutenant Calley was found guilty of the premeditated murder of 
twenty-two noncombatants and of assault with intent t o  murder a 
two-year-old child. Although Calley was sentenced to a dismissal 
and confinement a t  hard labor for life, the convening authority 
reduced this sentence to  a dismissal and twenty years at  hard 
labor. Subsequent t o  the convening authority’s action, the 
Secretary of the Army further reduced the sentence to a dismissal 
and ten years at  hard labor.35 
Aside from the issue of individual culpability for those 
involved in the massacre, My Lai had a devastating impact on the 
outcome of the Vietnam War. In particular, because the United 
States apparently had no grand strategy to win the war,36 this 
one atrocity arguably did as much to harm the survival of an 
independent South Vietnam as any other single event during the 
Indo-China War. The public revelation of this massacre not only 
solidified the anti-war movement in the United States, but also 
cast a pall of confusion and shame over the nation at large. This 
aura contributed significantly to the eventual abandonment of 
South Vietnam to the communist forces in the North. Beginning 
in 1969, a vocal minority of war protesters incorporated the 
United States soldier into their opposition to the war. For many 
of these people, the enemy was now the American fighting man- 
not the communists. 
33The~e  consisted of Major General Samuel W. Koster, Brigadier General 
George H. Young, Colonel Oran K. Henderson, Colonel Nels A. Parson, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert B. Luper, Major Charles C. Calhoun, Major David C. Gavin, Major 
Robert W. McKnight, Major Frederic W. Watke, First Lieutenant Kenneth W. 
Boatman, and First Lieutenant Dennis H. Johnson. See PEERS REPORT, supra note 
13, a t  221-22. 
34United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973). 
35William Calley, Jr. ,  actually served a total of only three years under 
house arrest a t  Fort Benning, Georgia, and six months a t  the confinement facility 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (from June 1974 to November 1974). Calley was 
released from confinement at Fort Leavenworth when his sentence was 
overturned by a federal district judge in Georgia. When the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reinstated the conviction, Calley was not returned to confinement; 
instead, he was paroled by the Secretary of The Army in 1975. He works today in 
his father-in-law’s jewelry store in Columbus, Georgia. See Wilson supra note 14, 
a t  53. 
36See infra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
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Within the military, the revelation of what happened at My 
Lai was a devastating blow to  esprit de corps and professionalism. 
Even now, twenty-five years after the incident, the United States 
Army continues to  recover from the pain that the My Lai 
massacre inflicted-a pain that still lingers in the very soul of 
every American soldier.37 
111. Why Did My Lai Happen? 
Notwithstanding the social and political machinations that 
were brewing in the United States in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Americans had little problem focusing on the immediate 
question raised in the aftermath of the massacre-that is, “Why 
did My Lai happen?” The nation legitimately wondered how so 
many American soldiers could have become involved in such a 
heinous war crime.38 More importantly, Americans wondered how 
the officers in command of the operation could have ordered such 
atrocities or could have participated in the attempt to cover them 
up. To realize that some civilians are killed as a collateral matter 
through military action against legitimate military targets was 
one thing; to  have ground forces intentionally shoot innocent 
noncombatants in cold blood was incomprehensible. 
A. The Peers Report 
The Peers Report did not limit the cause of the My Lai 
massacre to only one factor. While the panel observed that “what 
may have influenced one man to commit atrocities had no effect 
on another,”39 General Peers was determined that the final report 
should reflect some explanation as to why the massacre had 
occurred. Recognizing the inherent difficulty in finger pointing, 
31Army Teaches Gulf Soldiers How to Avoid My Lai Type Massacre, 
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Feb. 24, 1991, a t  A12 [hereinafter Avoid My Lail. 
38For a legal definition of the term, DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 499 (July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-101 (“The 
term war crime is the technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any 
person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war 
crime”). The definition in FM 27-10 would include both customary and treaty law 
in the realm law of war. For a layman’s definition, see also INT’L L. DIV., THE 
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, US. ARMY, JA 401, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
BASIC COURSE DESKBOOK 4-2 (July 1992) (“A non-legal, generic term for all illegal 
actions relating to  the inception or conduct of warfare. It  includes all the separate 
categories of offenses tried at  Nuremburg. A more accurate term for this would be: 
Crimes under International Law”) Under a strict definition, the murder of civilian 
co-belligerents would be a crime, but not necessarily a war crime because the 
victims would not be protected persons under any international agreement or 
general customary principles relating to  the conduct of war. By popular reference, 
however, such acts commonly are referred to as war crimes. 
3 9 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  229. 
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the panel nonetheless identified several factors that seemed to be 
conducive t o  an environment that might lead to violations of the 
law of war. 
1. Lack of Proper Training.-The lack of proper training in 
the law of war was a common theme in the interviews of the 
witnesses and subjects involved in the My Lai massacre. Perhaps 
the most graphic illustration of this factor appeared at the trial of 
Lieutenant Calley, when Calley testified that the Geneva 
Convention classes conducted during Officer Candidate School 
were inadequate.40 Regardless of the overall veracity of Calley’s 
claim, the Peers Report entered specific findings that the soldiers 
who composed Task Force Barker had not received sufficient 
training in the “Law of War (Hague and Geneva Conventions), 
the safeguarding of noncombatants, or the Rules of Engage- 
ment.”41 Although the requirements set out in United States 
Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) Regulation 350-1, dated 10 
November 1967, clarified that, at  a minimum, all soldiers were 
required to  have annual refresher training in the Geneva 
Conventions, many commanders failed to  emphasize this require- 
ment. Consequently, individual soldiers often lacked proper 
training on the requirements imposed by these conventions. 
The Commission also found that, although pocket-size 
guidance cards were issued to all soldiers t o  help them learn and 
abide by the law of war, the soldiers usually never read the 
information on the cards and the cards themselves rarely 
survived the first monsoon rains.42 In addition, Military Assist- 
ance Command Vietnam Directive 20-4,43 which required the 
immediate reporting of all violations of the law of war, seldom 
was stressed by the command structure. 
Despite these particular shortcomings, however, the Peers 
Report did not find deficiencies in the law of war training to be a 
*‘See United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R.), afd, 22 C.M.A. 
534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973). But see Interview with Lindsay Dorrier by Major Jeffrey 
Addicott, in Charlottesville, Va. (12 Mar. 1992). A former classmate of Calley, Mr. 
Dorrier recalls that  the Officer Candidate School did provide adequate law of war 
training to  the students. Actually, all those going through Officer Candidate 
School received training in the four Geneva Conventions. 
4 1 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  230. 
42See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at  220. Four of the cards were 
entitled “The Enemy in Your Hands,” “Nine Rules,” “Code of Conduct,” and 
“Geneva Conventions.” 
43See Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Directive 20-4 (20 Apr. 1965) 
(requiring the immediate reporting of any alleged violation of the law of war to 
the next higher military authority, as well as  directly to  Headquarters, Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam, located in Saigon). 
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significant reason for the grave breaches44 that occurred at My 
Lai. Such deficiencies in training might excuse minor or technical 
breaches of the law of war, but not the grave malum in se 
breaches that were before the Commission. The members of the 
Commission correctly noted that “there were some things a 
soldier did not have to be told were wrong-such as rounding up 
women and children and then mowing them down, shooting 
babies out of mother’s arms, and raping.”45 Therefore, the 
Commission apparently had no hesitation in concluding that some 
of the members of the company-both enlisted men and officers- 
simply were criminals.46 These individuals clearly were in an 
environment in which little, if anything, deterred them from 
overtly expressing their criminal propensities. 
2. Attitude Toward the Vietnamese.-In addition t o  the lack 
of proper training, a tendency by some of the members of Charlie 
Company to view the Vietnamese people as almost subhuman was 
another factor that may have contributed to the massacre. The 
use of derogatory terms to describe the Vietnamese as nothing but 
“gooks,” “dinks,” or “slopes” was not uncommon during the 
Vietnam War. Actually, soldiers in all wars have developed 
derogatory phrases to  describe their enemies;47 such characteriza- 
tions of inferiority inure soldiers t o  killing their enemy. In the My 
Lai case, however, the Peers Report concluded that some of the 
members of Charlie Company had carried this practice of 
dehumanizing the enemy to an unreasonable extreme, viewing 
44The term “grave breaches” technically is related only to  specific violations 
defined as such in the Geneva Conventions. Grave breaches include specific acts 
committed against persons or property such as willful killing, torture, or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering, or 
willfully causing serious injury to body or health. See FM 27-10 supra note 35, at  179. 
4 5 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  230. 
46While one may possess a propensity for criminal behavior, all behavior is 
controlled directly by the individual’s volition. In turn, the act of choosing to 
commit a crime often is related to a crude cost-benefit analysis process. Obviously, 
crime more likely will occur in an environment in which the likelihood of 
punishment is minimal. For an excellent discussion on how the criminal mind 
functions, see Dr. Stanton E. Samenow, Jr., INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND 6 (1984). 
Criminals cause crime-not bad neighborhoods, inadequate 
parents, television, schools, drugs, or unemployment. Crime resides in 
the minds of human beings and is not caused by social conditions. 
Once we as  a society recognize this simple fact, we shall take 
measures radically different from current ones. To be sure, we shall 
continue to remedy intolerable social conditions for this is worthwhile 
in and of itself. But we shall not expect criminals to change because 
of such efforts. 
Id.  
471n World War 11, Americans called the Germans “Krauts” and called the 
Japanese “Nips.” In the Gulf War, some United States troops referred to  the 
Iraqis as  “Rag Heads.” 
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the “Vietnamese with contempt, considering them subhuman, on 
the level of dogs.”48 
To discover the reason for such unsettling hatred, the Peers 
Report had a detailed background analysis performed on each 
individual in Company C. The results, however, revealed nothing 
unusual. The company was a then-average unit with seventy 
percent of its troops having high school diplomas and nineteen 
percent having some college education. The Commission con- 
cluded that the hatred was a result of a combination of several 
factors, the greatest of which was merely the arrogance inherent 
in the criminal mind; the least of which was the frustration of 
having to  fight an enemy who refused to abide by the law of 
war .49 
3. Nature of the Enemy.-One of the most telling factors 
listed in the Peers Report dealt with examining the nature of the 
enemy forces that infested South Vietnam, with the implicit 
criticism that the United States military never was allowed to  
take the war to  the real enemy-North Vietnam. In the South, 
the United States military was asked to carry out primarily 
defensive operations against a well-trained and well-equipped 
guerilla force that not only was indistinguishable from the local 
population, but also refused to abide by the established principles 
of the law of war. 
They would set up their bunkers in villages and 
attack from the midst of helpless civilians. Thus, 
surrounding themselves with and using innocent civil- 
ians to protect themselves is in itself a war crime and 
makes them criminally responsible for the resulting 
civilian dead. . .. [Tlhey would also directly attack 
villages and hamlets, kill the inhabitants, including 
children, in order to panic the civilians in the area and 
cause social chaos that the communist then could 
exploit.50 
The Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese Army soldiers 
knew every path, trail, and hut in their areas of operation. In 
addition, whether by brute force-which included public torture 
and execution-or by psychological intimidation, the Viet Cong 
could count on the local support of the civilian population for 
shelter, food, and intelligence. Similarly, these soldiers commonly 
could depend on women and children to  participate actively in 
4 8 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, at 230. 
49See infra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
50RUMMEL, supra note 8, a t  24. 
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military operations against United States forces.51 With women 
and children participating in actual combat activities-such as 
laying booby traps, serving as scouts, or carrying arms-the 
American soldier had to  disregard the traditional indicators of sex 
and age as criteria for categorizing the noncombatant and, 
instead, had to concentrate on the extremely difficult issue of 
hostile intent. The Peers Report recognized this dilemma. 
The communist forces in South Vietnam had long 
recognized our general reluctance to do battle with 
them among the civilian populace and had used that 
knowledge to our tactical and strategic disadvantage 
throughout the history of the war in Vietnam. Exploita- 
tion of that reluctance by . . . [the enemy] forces caused 
a distortion of the classic distinction between combat- 
ants and noncombatants.52 
Distinguishing between friend and foe among military-aged 
male Vietnamese was even more difficult. Having developed an 
incredible system of underground tunnels and caves, the Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese Army were able to appear and 
disappear at  will. Moreover, when under pressure, these soldiers 
took only seconds to remove all military insignia and equipment, 
and blend in with the local population. 
Without question, the use of guerilla tactics, characterized 
by a heavy reliance on booby traps and hit-and-run missions, had 
a tremendous adverse psychological impact on American com- 
manders and their troops. After numerous interviews, the Peers 
Report noted that the general attitude of the soldier was one of 
extreme tension about engaging this unseen enemy-an enemy 
who hid behind women and children and would not come out in 
the open to do battle.53 
Every civilian was viewed as a potential threat; every inch of 
ground was a potential hiding place for a booby trap or mine. 
Accordingly, descriptive terms such as “keyed up” frequently were 
used to describe the apprehension and frustration associated with 
going out on patrol or, in many cases, just being in a friendly 
village.54 The Viet Cong commonly would visit a friendly village 
a t  night, setting mines that would kill Americans the next day. 
Consequently, some of those who testified naturally assumed that 
51GOLDSTEIh. ET AL. ,  Supra note 13, a t  199. 
521d. a t  198-99. 
5 4 P ~ ~ ~ s  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  234. The suggestions that members of 
Task Force Barker were either high on marijuana or intoxicated were found to be 
without substance and not a significant factor in the operation. 
53 Id .  
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the “effects of mines and booby traps were the main reason for 
the atrocities committed by the task force.”55 This view is 
incorrect. While these factors undoubtedly contributed to the 
extraordinary level of tension in Task Force Barker, citing the 
illegal warfighting tactics of the enemy as the primary reason for 
the atrocity would be far too simplistic. Actually, if this factor was 
the main cause for My Lai, one would have expected many 
massacres similar t o  My Lai to have taken place throughout 
Vietnam. 
4. Organizational Problems.-One of the dominant charac- 
teristics of the Vietnam War was the lack of effective organization 
in the United States Army’s force structure. In the realm of 
directing combat operations, the lack of effective command and 
control can be disastrous. From the brigade level, down to  
platoons, shortages of personnel and frequent rotations resulted 
in ad hoc arrangements in composing military units. 
Adding to the organizational deficiencies was the influx of 
poorly trained or ill-disciplined troops who were assigned to 
Vietnam on “short” tours of only one year.56 These short tours 
virtually ensured that problems in command and control would 
arise. By the time the soldier had gained the necessary experience 
to be an  effective member of a unit, he was eligible for transfer 
back to the “States.” 
Taking strong note of the overall organizational problems 
throughout the Army structure in Vietnam, the Peers Report 
found that certain specific organizational problems in Task Force 
Barker “played the most prominent part in the My Lai 
incident.”57 Focusing on the structure of Task Force Barker, the 
report noted that the lack of staff personnel was a serious 
impediment to effective command and control. The task force 
“could hardly function properly, particularly in such matters as 
development of intelligence, planning and supervision of opera- 
tions, and even routine administration.”58 
In addition to the general organizational problems in the 
task force, the plans and orders that delineated the operation into 
Son My lacked clarity. Because the entire operation was based on 
intelligence that anticipated a large enemy force in the area, the 
American soldiers initially expected that they were going to be 
551d. at  235. 
‘‘Id. Many of the combat officer positions were rotated after only six 
months in the field. 
571d. 
581d. at 235. 
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outnumbered by at  least two t o  one.59 In addition, the task force 
leaders regularly employed the term l‘search and destroy”60 
without providing an adequate definition to the troops. Despite 
the term’s connotation, “search and destroy” never was meant to  
provide soldiers with a “license to kill” whoever was encountered 
during an operation. In particular, the Peers Report found that 
the command gave no instructions to its soldiers on how to handle 
the civilians that they inevitably would encounter during the Son 
My operation.61 
5. Leadershzp. -In the final analysis, organizational prob- 
lems contributed to an overall atmosphere that made the events 
a t  My Lai possible. The most fundamental aspect of the task 
force’s pervasive structural deficiency, however, was the command 
and control problem created by the tremendous lack of leadership 
at the ground level. 
‘You know what t o  do with them,” [Lieutenant] 
Calley said, and walked off. Ten minutes later he 
returned and asked, “Haven’t you got rid of them yet? I 
want them dead. Waste them.” . . . . We stood about ten 
to fifteen feet away from them [a group of eighty men, 
women, and children herded together] and then [Lieu- 
tenant Calley] started shooting them. I used more than 
a whole clip-used four or five clips.62 
As with almost any military operation, success or failure 
depends, t o  a t  least some degree, on proper leadership. In the 
case of My Lai, however, the lack of responsible leadership was 
obvious. More importantly, as the above passage indicates, that 
failure of leadership was manifest a t  the very level a t  which it 
was most critical-the junior officer leve1.63 Although the Peers 
59See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
6 0 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  236. The military no longer uses the 
term “search and destroy.” During the Vietnam War, it was defined as a “military 
operation conducted for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy forces, 
installations, resources, and base areas.” See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, a t  
389. 
6 1 P ~ ~ ~ ~  REPORT, supra note 13, a t  237. 
62Wilson, supra note 14, a t  52 (citing Private Paul D. Medlo (1969)); 
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, a t  499. Another witness, Private First Class 
Dennis Conti, related a t  the trial of Lieutenant Calley that he and Medlo were 
told to “take care of the people.” When Lieutenant Calley returned, however, he 
was upset that the civilians had not been killed. Lieutenant Calley then stated, “I 
mean kill them.” 
63The My Lai massacre was not the only command-directed atrocity in 
Vietnam. A few less extensive killings occurred in which superiors unlawfully 
ordered subordinates to kill civilians. See, e.g., GARY D. SOLIS, MARINES AND 
MILITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE 176 (1989). 
[Lance Corporal] Herrod gave the order to kill . . . the people, 
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Report faulted all levels of command, noting that “at all levels, 
from division down to platoon, leadership or the lack of it was 
perhaps the principal causative factor in the tragic events before, 
during, and after the My Lai operation,”6* the direct underlying 
deficiency most certainly rested at the company and platoon level. 
By virtue of the chain of command structure of the military, 
the primary responsibility for ensuring adherence t o  the law of 
war rests on the officer corps. This structure demands the highest 
levels of professionalism from the junior officers at the platoon 
and company level, at which soldiers are most apt t o  encounter 
the vast majority of law of war issues. Simply put, soldiers are 
expected to  obey the law of war and their officers are expected to 
ensure that they do. 
The difficult issue in enforcing the law of war is not in how 
to deal with soldiers or officers who, in their individual capacities, 
violate the law of war-they normally are punished by courts- 
martial.65 Rather, the really difficult issues arise when an officer 
orders his or her soldiers t o  commit war crimes, or knowingly 
fails to control soldiers under his or her command who violate the 
law of war.66 Clearly, the most difficult issue to arise from the My 
and I told him not to do it . . . . Then he says, “Well, I have orders to 
do this by the company commander, and I want it done,” and he said 
it again, “I want these people killed!” And I turned to PFC Boyd, and 
I said to  PFC Boyd, “Is he crazy, or what?” And Boyd said, “I don’t 
know, he must be.” . . . And then everybody started opening up on the 
people. 
6 4 P ~ ~ ~ s  REPORT, supra note 13, at  232. 
65See FM 27-10, supra note 38, para. 506(a). Under the Geneva 
Conventions, each nation is under a strict obligation to search for all persons 
alleged to have committed war crimes, to investigate the allegations of war 
crimes, and t o  prosecute or extradite those so accused. The policy of the United 
States is that all American military personnel so accused will be prosecuted by 
military courts-marital under the substantive provisions of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. See also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 870-91 
(1991). 
66See LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS 165-67 (1981). Under the 
concept of command responsibility or indirect responsibility, a commander can be 
charged with the law of war violations committed by his or her subordinates if he 
or she ordered the crimes committed or “knew that a crime was about to  be 
committed, had the power to prevent it, and failed to  exercise that power.” In the 
United States, this standard has come to  be known as the Medina Standard, so 
named for Captain Ernest Medina. A second standard for indirect responsibility 
that has been the object of a great deal of debate and is recognized only in the 
United States, is the Yamashita Standard. The Yamashita Standard is named for 
the World War I1 Japanese general, Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was tried before a 
military commission for war crimes committed by soldiers under his command. 
The primary charge against Yamashita concerned 20,000 Japanese sailors under 
his command who went on a murder and rape rampage in Manila near the end of 
the war. Although the prosecution was unable to  prove that Yamashita ordered 
the crimes, or even knew about them, he was convicted under a “should have 
Id. (quoting Lance Corporal Michael S. Krichten, Vietnam 1970). 
170 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139 
Lai incident was how to reconcile command-directed breaches of 
the law of war with the concept of following orders. If every 
soldier is expected to obey the lawful order of a superior, lest face 
the ominous prospect of a court-martial, how should a soldier 
react to an  unlawful order-that is, of course, assuming the 
soldier actually can recognize the order as an unlawful 0ne?67 
In considering the question whether a superior 
order constitutes a valid defense, the court shall take 
into consideration the fact that obedience t o  lawful 
military orders is the duty of every member of the 
armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected, in 
conditions of war discipline, to weigh scrupulously the 
legal merits of the orders received; that certain rules of 
warfare may be controversial; or that an act otherwise 
amounting t o  a war crime may be done in obedience to 
orders conceived as a measure of reprisal. At the same 
time it must be borne in mind that members of the 
armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders.68 
Furthermore, soldiers normally cannot depend on the 
defense of superior orders to protect them from charges that they 
carried out unlawful orders. Instead, the law holds the soldier 
fully responsible for his or her acts or omissions. When a soldier 
raises superior orders as a defense, however, a court will apply a 
two-tier test to determine if the defense is cognizable. The first 
tier is a subjective one concentrating on whether or not the 
accused knew that the order was illegal. If the accused did not 
know that the order was illegal then the inquiry shifts to the 
second tier, a t  which the court must determine whether the 
accused reasonably could have been expected to know that the 
order was illegal. “The fact that the law of war has been violated 
pursuant to an order of a superior authority . . .  does not 
constitute a defense . . .  unless [the accused1 did not know and 
could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act 
ordered was unlawful.”69 Although the objective tier of the two- 
part test draws upon the “reasonable man” standard, the 
known” standard. This standard permits a commander to  be found guilty for war 
crimes under a theory that,  through normal events, the commander should have 
known of the war crimes of those under his or her command, and did nothing to 
stop them. The commander, therefore, is vicariously guilty of the actions of his or 
her soldiers. This “should have known” standard applies only when the war 
crimes are associated with a widespread pattern of abuse over a prolonged period 
of time. In such a scenario, the commander is presumed to have knowledge of the 
crime or  to  have abandoned his or  her command. 
67See FM 27-10, supra note 38, para. 509. 
681d. para. 509. 
6 9 ~ .  
19931 25TH ANNNERSARY OF MY LAI 171 
standard actually considers the actions of a reasonable man under 
the stresses present in the particular combat environment. 
The task of distinguishing the legitimacy of the orders of a 
superior also must be viewed against the entire concept of 
enforced discipline, which the military systematizes from the first 
day a recruit enters boot camp until the day he or she is 
discharged. The requirement for enforced discipline is absolutely 
essential t o  ensure that in the unnatural conditions of the combat 
environment soldiers will be able to function properly. No army 
could survive without a system promoting genuine and enforced 
discipline, which is rooted firmly in the requirement t o  obey the 
directions of superiors. Accordingly, if soldiers are expected to  
obey all lawful orders, a fortiori, they reasonably cannot be 
expected to scrupulously weigh the legal merits of orders received 
under the stresses of combat.70 
Consequently, an army must fill its officer corps with only 
the finest available men and women. Nowhere is this requirement 
more essential than in the selection and placement of the men 
who serve as officers in combat units. Only men of the highest 
moral caliber and military skill should be assigned the respon- 
sibility of combat command. In commenting on leadership skills 
for officers, General George S. Patton, Jr., correctly stated, “If you 
do not enforce and maintain discipline, [officers] are potential 
murderers.”71 
General Patton’s comment prophesied the tragedy at My Lai. 
Several of the junior officers on the scene were totally inadequate, 
not only in their moral characters and integrities, but also in 
basic military skills. As they exhibited by their behaviors,72 these 
officers were totally unworthy of the responsibility of command. 
They were murderers. 
Not surprisingly, William Calley-the centerpiece of the 
command-directed killings-was not the type of individual who 
70 Id.  
“PETER B. WILLIAMSON, PATTON’S PRINCIPLES: A HANDBOOK FOR MANAGERS 
WHO MEAN IT 35 (1979). 
72See supra note 46 and accompanying text. For an interesting observation 
concerning the nature of man, see THE DICTIONARY OF WAR QUOTATIONS 341 
(Justin Wintle ed., 1989). Anne Frank wrote the following in 1942: 
I don’t believe that the big men, the politicians and the 
capitalists alone, are guilty of war. Oh no, the little man is just as  
guilty, otherwise the peoples of the world would have risen in revolt 
long ago. There’s in  people simply an urge to destroy, an urge to kill, 
to  murder and rage, and until all mankind, without exception, 
undergoes a great change, wars will be waged, everything that has 
been built up, cultivated, and grown will be destroyed and disfigured, 
after which mankind will have to begin all over again. 
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should have been charged with leadership responsibilities of any 
nature. Having flunked out of a junior college in Miami, Calley 
moved west before enlisting in the Army in 1966.73 Once in the 
Army, Calley somehow was selected to attend Officers Candidate 
School, where he graduated despite poor academic marks.74 
Assigned to the field as a platoon leader in a combat unit, the 
soldiers under his command quickly discovered that Lieutenant 
Calley did not even understand basic military combat skills. As 
one rifleman in the platoon put it, “I wonder how he ever got 
through Officer Candidate School. [Calley] couldn’t read no darn 
[sic] map and a compass would confuse his ass.”75 
Accordingly, the factor that impacted most directly on the 
crime a t  My Lai certainly rested on the shoulders of a few junior 
officers on the ground-Lieutenant William Calley being one of 
the worst. All of the evidence suggests that Lieutenant Calley 
initiated much of the murder, acting both in his individual 
capacity and-far more shamefully-in his capacity as an officer 
in charge of subordinates. Abusing the authority of his position, 
Lieutenant Calley directly ordered the soldiers under his 
command t o  commit murder; some of the men obeyed, while some 
did not. While no one can pardon the behavior of those who 
carried out the illegal orders, the real tragedy of My Lai was the 
absence of competent leadership. 
As Sun Tzu laid out almost 2500 years ago, “The commander 
stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, 
and strictness.”76 Instead of setting the standard for moral 
conduct, Calley performed exactly in the opposite manner. He 
represented the antithesis of what a commander should be. 
6. The Lack of a Grand Strategy by the United States.-A 
final factor that bears exploration is one that few commentators 
on My Lai have properly gauged-that is, the full impact that the 
lack of a grand strategy by the United States had on the outcome 
of the Indo-China conflict. My Lai actually was made possible 
because of the total and complete absence of a grand strategy to 
deal with the communist-sponsored aggression against South 
Vietnam. 
If the concept of a grand strategy is defined as the use of a 
state’s full national power to  achieve a particular objective, the 
United States clearly had no grand strategy for dealing with the 
73Wilson, supra note 14, a t  50. 
751d. (remarks of Rifleman Roy L. A. Wood). 
7 6 T ~ ~  ART OF WAR: SUN Tzu 9 (James Clavell ed., 1983) 
74 Id.  
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communist aggression in Vietnam. The communists, on the other 
hand, obviously had a complete and dedicated grand strategy for 
conquering all of Indo-China through the use of revolutionary 
warfare.77 
A sound grand strategy envisages the means by which a 
nation will take advantage of its strengths and will exploit its 
enemy’s vulnerabilities; concomitatantly, such a grand strategy 
comprises the methods by which the nation will diminish its 
weaknesses and neutralize the enemy’s strengths. In practically 
every category of factors associated with the art of waging war, 
the communists fulfilled this formula, while the United States did 
not. Therefore, while the communists mobilized all of the people 
under their control in a unified effort, the United States 
consistently sought t o  disassociate the American people from the 
war. 
The communists were well aware that their forces were no 
match for the far superior power of American combat forces and 
knew that engaging the United States in conventional warfare 
was pure folly. Nevertheless, they apparently were extremely 
effective at drawing on their strengths, while the United States 
typically refused to  use its overwhelming might. Accordingly, the 
enemy found that it effectively could employ hit-and-run tactics 
against selected targets. Coupled with guerilla tactics deliberately 
focused on becoming the unseen enemy, the communists illegally 
took advantage of the American respect for the law of war. By 
hiding themselves among civilian populations, the communists 
intentionally sought to blur the distinction between the combat- 
ant and the noncombatant, “hoping either for immunity from 
attack or to provoke . . . indiscriminate attack.”78 Establishing 
well-stocked sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and Laos, the 
communists were immune from defeat as long as the United 
States refused to  attack these bases. 
Finally, in tandem with their guerilla tactics, the commu- 
nists relied heavily on all forms of propaganda, placing special 
emphasis on the ambiguity of words to  erode the national will of 
the United States t o  continue the war. While the North 
Vietnamese leadership falsely would portray the conflict as a 
protracted war waged by agrarian reformers with no end in sight, 
77See KEVIN M. GENEROUS, VIETNAM: THE SECRET WAR (1985). The term 
“revolutionary war” refers to a strategy characterized by disinformation and 
guerilla tactics. 
78Thomas J. Begines, The American Military and the Western Idea, MIL. 
REV., Mar. 1992, a t  39, 42. 
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it often would promise a negotiated settlement and a termination 
of its army’s hostilities a t  any moment. 
Although many of the factors discussed above contributed t o  
the communists’ prevailing in Vietnam, their strategy’s ultimate 
success can be attributed to the United States’ failing to  develop 
its own coherent grand strategy. Surprisingly, not until 1968 did 
the impact of not having a viable grand strategy become apparent 
to the American soldier. United States combat troops then finally 
began to recognize that they were fighting and risking their lives 
to attain no comprehensive national objective. This revelation 
initiated a festering demoralization among members of the United 
States military forces in Vietnam. 
This demoralization was manifest in every action involving 
American ground soldiers. In addition, as  the attendant anti-war 
protests at home increased, more soldiers seriously questioned the 
efficacy of their sacrifices in Vietnam. More importantly, Ameri- 
can soldiers such as those at My Lai realized that the emphasis of 
the American leadership was not on achieving peace through a 
military victory, but on peace through negotiations-negotiations 
that constantly promised an end to the war at any time. As a 
consequence, no one wanted to be the last casualty in a war that 
was not supported at  home and which the United States 
government refused to  let the military win. The specter of dying 
in vain weighed heavily on the mind of the individual soldier and, 
to  a degree, degenerated that soldier’s respect for his own chain of 
command. 
IV. The Lessons of My Lai 
The massacre at My Lai cannot be undone. In developing a 
methodology for preventing future atrocities, however, the images 
of the horror of My Lai illustrate perfectly the necessity for 
abiding by the law of war. The Peers Report also is a valuable 
tool in attempting to explain some of the factors that seemed t o  
create an  environment in which law of war violations were more 
likely to occur. Taken together, these resources teach three 
fundamental lessons. 
A. Soldiers Must Understand the Rationale for the Law of War 
One of the most troubling issues for American soldiers is the 
realization that in many of the wars that the United States has 
fought, the enemy openly and repeatedly has violated numerous 
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provisions of the law of war.79 In the Vietnam War, the North 
Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong regularly engaged in 
command-directed atrocities on a massive scale.80 For example, 
virtually every American prisoner of war was tortured and 
maltreated in flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions. 
For many American soldiers, the knowledge of enemy 
violations elicits a negative response to  law of war issues. The 
realization that the enemy may refuse to abide by the law of war 
often prompts the instinctive response, “Why should I care about 
the rules if the enemy doesn’t?’’ Informing the soldier that he or 
she will be punished for law of war violations is not enough; 
ensuring that the soldier understands the basic rationale for 
abiding by the law of war is imperative. Accordingly, military 
leaders must impart the soldier with a basic understanding of the 
entire concept of the development of rules regulating combat. 
If the military establishment cannot understand the funda- 
mental rationale and historical basis for having a law of war, 
then the tragedy a t  My Lai certainly will be repeated. This is the 
first lesson of My Lai; soldiers not only must know the law of war, 
but also must be able to understand the necessity and rationale 
for having a law of war. 
1. Necessity for the Law of War.-Warfare is not a novel 
phenomenon; it is as old as human history itself. Even a cursory 
review of the practice reveals that all cultures and societies have 
participated in warfare-either in defense or in aggression. In 
addition, as long as mankind has practiced war, rules have 
existed to lessen and regulate the attendant sufferings associated 
with warfare. In the modern world, either by treaty law or 
through customarysl international law, every nation is bound 
legally by a universal body of law known as the law of war. 
79See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., MIGHT v. RIGHT 126 (2d ed. 1991). The conduct 
of the Iraqis during the Persian Gulf War made a mockery of almost every precept 
in international law. Actually, throughout the entire war, Saddam Hussein made 
no attempt even to conceal his open violations of the law of war, the United 
Nations Charter, or  any other applicable international norm. As one Pentagon 
official noted, “it was as  if Saddam Hussein awoke one morning and asked, ‘What 
international law shall I violate today?’ ” 
s o R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
“A state may express its consent to be bound by a treaty in  one of the 
following ways: (1) signature, followed by ratification; (2) accession; or (3) a 
declaration of succession. Even absent consent, however, a state nevertheless may 
become bound by those standards and norms of behavior that,  through widespread 
acceptance in the international community, have entered the realm of customary 
principles of international law. Customary principles derive from the recognition 
of long-term uniform practices among nations. Indicia of customary international 
law are judicial rulings, the writings of renowned jurists, diplomatic interactions, 
and other documentary sources. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. Accordingly, both 
international law and the law of war derive from numerous sources. 
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Individuals uninitiated to the study of war understandably 
may be puzzled that one of humanity’s most violent activities 
should be governed by rules of conduct. Some writers, such as Leo 
Tolstoy, even have argued that the very establishment of rules 
that seek to regulate warfare are per se immoral because such 
rules wrongfully cloak war with a form of legitimacy and 
therefore are counterproductive t o  the goal of eliminating the 
scourge of war itself. Accordingly, Tolstoy advanced the notion 
that the waging of war should not be regulated. Tolstoy proposed 
that “when [war] becomes too horrible, rational men will outlaw 
war altogether.”s2 Most commentators, however, have rejected 
this utopian attitude, acknowledging the necessity of rules of 
conduct to mitigate the various categories of suffering that are 
the natural consequence of war.83 The law of war never was 
intended to  be an “idealistic proscription against war.”84 
The current body of the law of war consists of all laws that, 
by treaty and customary principles, are applicable to warfare. The 
cornerstones of the modern law of war are the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.85 The basic goal of the law of war is to limit 
the impact of the inevitable evils of war by “(1) protecting both 
combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (2) 
safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who 
fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the 
wounded and sick, and civilians; and (3) facilitating the 
restoration of peace.”86 
2. Origins of the Law of War.-Many people harbor the mis- 
conception that rules regulating warfare are of relatively recent 
origin, arising in the aftermath of World War I1 or, at  least, no 
earlier than World War I. As long as man has fought in wars, 
however, rules to reduce the suffering to  both the environment 
and to other humans have existed. While some of these ancient 
s z L ~ ~  TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 45 (18681. 
s3See generally DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED 
CONFLICT (19881. 
84See DEP’T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. 11, at  
38 (23 Oct. 1962). 
85The 1949 Geneva Conventions cover four categories: (1) Geneva 
Convention of August 12, 1949, for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at  Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention of 
August 12, 1949, Relative to  the Treatment of Prisoners of War 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Convention of August 12, 
1949, Relative to  the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
86FM 27-10, supra note 38, para. 2. 
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rules would be inconsistent with the modern humanitarian 
concepts reflected in the current law of war, many of the 
provisions in the modern law of war are derived directly from 
some of the earliest formulations of rules regulating warfare. For 
example, in the book of Deuteronomy, the ancient Hebrews were 
given specific instructions on the protections that were to  be 
afforded to  the persons or property of an enemy city under 
siege.87 Generally, if the city surrendered, the inhabitants were 
not t o  be harmed. If the city refused t o  surrender, but 
subsequently was captured, no women or children were to be 
molested. In all cases, however, torture absolutely was prohibited. 
Similarly, protection for the environment also was also codified. 
For example, fruit trees located outside of a besieged city were 
protected from unnecessary damage. Soldiers could partake of the 
fruit, but cutting down the trees was unlawful. 
Acknowledging that the modern law of war rests firmly on 
an ancient foundation of intrinsically acceptable humanitarian 
concerns is only one reason why the law of war has enjoyed 
universal acceptance through time. Understanding that such 
rules are valuable moral axioms only captures part of the 
significance of their development and utility. Clearly, the 
historical development of rules regulating warfare also follows a 
general pattern of what might be termed “pragmatic necessity.’’ 
While many of the rules limiting suffering undoubtedly were 
based on humanitarian concerns, the basic rationale for having a 
law of war arguably has been rooted in several collateral 
principles of self-interest. 
First, under the concept of reciprocity, nations would develop 
and adhere to  laws of war because they were confident that their 
enemies also would abide by those rules under a quid pro quo 
theory. This mutual assurance theory long has been recognized 
not only as a primary motivator for establishing rules regulating 
warfare, but also as the centerpiece in almost every other function 
of international intercourse. 
The second element in the development of the law of war 
also reflects self-interest. Alexander the Great88 exemplified this 
87DEuTERoNoMY 20:10-20. But see id. 21:17-18. Some mandates were given 
for the Hebrews to  kill all of the citizens of a few selected cultures. This practice, 
however, was the exception and was related to halting the spread of systematic 
human sacrifice and phallic cult practices associated with those cultures. 
“Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) conquered a n  enormous empire which 
extended from India to Europe and from Asia Minor to  North Africa. Alexander is 
recognized as  one of the finest strategists, tacticians, and military commanders in 
the ancient world. See R. ERNEST DUPW & TREVOR N. DUPW, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF MILITARY HISTORY 47-54 (1977). 
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element when, on the eve of practically every battle, he 
admonished to his army, “Why should we destroy those things 
which shall soon be ours?”89 Under this reasoning, particularly in 
the context of securing limited amounts of spoil, the destruction of 
anything beyond military targets to subdue the enemy’s military 
forces would be neither beneficial nor reasonable. Under modern 
principles, similar violations of the law of war would not 
contribute to the goal of the collection of legitimate reparations- 
a measure often employed against the aggressor nation.90 
A third line of reasoning in the development of the law of 
war derives from an acceptance that abuses seldom shorten the 
length of the conflict and are never beneficial in facilitating the 
restoration of peace. For instance, targeting nonmilitary property 
usually produces undesireable effects. The activities of General 
William Sherman during the Civil War illustrate this point. 
General Sherman’s widespread looting and burning of civilian 
homes and personal property on his march through Georgia in the 
fall of 1864 did not contribute significantly to the defeat of the 
89 Id.  
goDefinition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 G.O.A.R. Supp. 31, U.N. Doc. 
N9631, a t  142. The United Nations Definition of Aggression Resolution states, in 
part the following: 
ARTICLE 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations . . . . 
ARTICLE 2. The first use of armed force by a State in 
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facia evidence of 
an act of aggression . . . . 
ARTICLE 3. Any of the following acts, regardless of a 
declaration of war, shall . . .  qualify as  an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against 
the territory of another State . . . ; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the 
armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, 
sea or air forces, or marine and airfleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State . . .  in 
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement 
or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; 
(0 The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it 
has placed a t  the disposal of another State, to be used by that 
other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third 
State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State of such gravity as to  amount to the 
acts listed above. or its substantial involvement therein. 
of another State or part thereof; 
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Confederacy.91 On the contrary, his actions simply strengthened 
the resolve of the enemy to resist, while sowing the seeds of 
bitterness for generations to come.92 
Clearly, the intelligent warfighter makes every effort t o  
comply with, and even to exceed, the requirements of the law of 
war-particularly in the treatment of prisoners of war and 
noncombatants. A nation’s enforcement of humane treatment not 
only demonstrates the best evidence that it is the party waging a 
j us  in beZZo,93 but also often serves as the best avenue to  counter 
enemy propaganda of law of war violations. As the pragmatic 
Prussian soldier and author, Karl von Clausewitz observed, “If we 
find that civilized nations do not . . .  devastate towns and 
countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater 
influence on their mode of carrying on war, and has taught them 
a more effectual means of applying force ....”94 
A fourth factor in the development of the law of war is a 
matter of military pragmatism. Specifically, using limited military 
resources to  destroy civilian targets wastes assets that a force 
otherwise could employ to defeat the enemy’s military. Accord- 
ingly, such conduct is simply counterproductive, and “rarely gains 
the violator a distinct military advantage.”95 
The final rationale-albeit of greater impact in an era 
characterized by the widespread dissemination of information- 
derives from the very nature of the modern, civilized nation-state. 
States that adhere to the principles of democratic institutions and 
fundamental human rights will not tolerate activities that are 
”See Thomas Robertson, The War in Words, CIVIL WAR TIMES ILLUS., Oct. 
1979, a t  20 (“Although the havoc wreaked by Sherman’s hordes contributed to the 
Confederate defeat, this contribution was so indirect and ambiguous that it  did 
not justify militarily, much less morally, the human misery that accompanied and 
followed it”). 
”See, e.g., RUSSEL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 301 
(1984). 
93Jus in bello refers to just conduct, in war or abiding by the law of war 
under the concepts of proportionality, military necessity, and unnecessary 
suffering. The concept of waging a just war, j u s  ad bellurn, encompasses several 
elements. These elements include the following: (1) just cause; (2) legitimate 
authority; (3) just intentions; (4) public declaration of causes and intentions; 
(5) proportionality in results; (6) last resort; and ( 7 )  a reasonable hope of success. 
With the adoption of the United Nations Charter, however, j u s  ad bellurn is no 
longer a viable tool in determining when force is lawful. The United Nations 
Charter mandates that the analysis for determining the legitimate use of force 
turn on the self-defense provisions of Article 51. See WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE 
CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 37-70 (1981). 
9 4 ~ ~  VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 4 (J. Graham trans., 1918). 
95H. Wayne Elliott, Theory and Practice: Some Suggestions for the Law of 
War Trainer, ARMY LAW., July 1983, a t  1. 
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conducted in defiance of the rule of law.96 As brought out so 
strongly by the My Lai incident, civilized societies will not provide 
the necessary homefront support for an army that it perceives t o  
be acting in violation of the law of war. Although in the radical 
regime97 this factor generally is ignored, in the United States-as 
in all democratic societies-this element of homefront support is 
absolutely essential t o  any deployment and sustainment of 
military forces. Actually, the precept that a civilized society must 
adhere to basic, minimum “standards of morality transcends 
national boundaries.”98 
Sustaining homefront support is not always easy for the 
military. In part, the difficulty rests in the associated phe- 
nomenon of “imputed responsibility”-that is, the responsibility 
for the acts of a few soldiers who engage in egregious abuses of 
the law of war immediately can be imputed to the entire military 
establishment. Accordingly, because Lieutenant Calley and a 
handful of others murdered babies at My Lai, some segments of 
the public viewed all American soldiers in Vietnam as baby 
killers. The mass media largely feed this phenomenon, as 
reflected by almost every movie on the Vietnam War. In American 
cinema, the soldier routinely has been depicted engaging in 
abuses of the law of war or ingesting illegal drugs. That the vast 
majority of American soldiers participated in neither of these 
practices is not shown.99 Consequently, the best method for the 
military to protect itself from imputed responsibility is to make 
every possible effort to  see that abuses do not occur and, if they 
96Zd. a t  7. 
97The term “radical regime” was coined by Professor John Norton Moore, 
Walter L. Brown Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, to  
describe totalitarian systems that are likely to resort to  violence to achieve goals. 
See JOHN NORTON MOORE, ET AL. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 77 (1990). Professor 
Moore describes the characteristics of the radical regime as follows: 
A radical totalitarian regime . . . seems to  blend together a 
mixture of a failing centrally planned economy, severe limitations on 
economic freedom, a one party political system, an absence of an 
independent judiciary, a police state with minimal human rights and 
political freedoms a t  home, denials of the right to emigrate, heavy 
involvement of the military in political leadership, a large percentage 
of the GNP devoted t o  the military sector, a high percentage of the 
population in the military, leaders strongly motivated by an ideology 
of “true beliefs” including willingness to use force, aggressively anti- 
Western and antidemocratic in behavior, and selective support for 
wars of national liberation, terrorism, and disinformation against 
Western or democratic interests. 
g8Zd. 
”See SOLIS, supra note 63,  at  vii. The vast majority of military personnel in 
Vietnam served with honor. In the Marines, “[olf the 448,OO Marines that served 
in Vietnam, only a small percentage came into contact with the military justice 
system. By far the greater number served honorably and never committed illegal 
or improper acts.” Id. 
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do, to  promptly investigate and punish those proven to be guilty. 
Under no circumstances can a cover-up be justified; the light 
must be shed promptly and fully on all allegations of war crimes. 
The law of war in the modern era, therefore, is based on a 
combination of rationales that reflect a mixture of pragmatic and 
moral concerns. The competent warfighter should understand that 
the factors include the following: (1) humanitarian concerns based 
on moral precepts; (2) the concept of reciprocity in behavior; (3) 
the desire for lawful reparations; (4) the desire t o  limit the scope 
and duration of the conflict and to facilitate the restoration of 
peace; (5) the effective use of military resources; and (6) the 
necessity for securing homefront support. 
B. Soldiers Must Be Trained in the Law of War 
The second lesson from My Lai needs little introduction: To 
be effective, the leaders constantly must teach the law of war to 
soldiers. The United States military long has held an outstanding 
reputation for adhering to the law of war because of its 
commitment t o  law of war training.100 Unfortunately, periods 
have arisen during which training has not been emphasized 
properly; these periods provided fertile ground for law of war 
violations. If it did nothing else, the massacre at  My Lai served as 
the “catalyst for a complete review of Army training in the law of 
war.”lOl 
The primary Department of Defense (DOD) response to the 
Peers Report was a directive entitled the “DOD Law of War 
Program.” The directive, which is still in effect, lists the following 
four specific DOD mandates: 
(1) The law of war and the obligations of the 
United States government under that law shall be 
observed fully by all members of the United States 
Armed Forces; 
(2) A law of war program, designed to prevent 
violations of the law of war, shall be implemented; 
(3) All alleged violations of the law of war, 
whether committed by or against United States or 
enemy personnel, shall be reported promptly, investi- 
gated thoroughly, and, when appropriate, remedied by 
corrective action; and 
“‘But see Fredrick A. Graf, Knowing the Law, PROCEEDINGS, June 1988, a t  
58. If the record United States is measured against the rules and not against its 
adversaries the record has “been far from perfect.” 
“‘Elliott, supra note 95, a t  9. 
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(4) All violations of the law alleged to have been 
committed by or against allied military or civilian 
personnel shall be reported through appropriate com- 
mand channels for ultimate transmission to appropriate 
agencies of allied governments. 
Specific responsibilities are assigned to  the secretaries of the 
military departments and the unified and specified commands on 
law of war training and instruction. The Army is the training 
proponent for the law of war for all branches of the military. In 
response to that mandate, the Army has developed a ready-made 
lesson plan for the law of war instructor, which includes detailed 
discussion in the following areas: 
(1) The rights and obligations of United States 
Army personnel regarding the enemy, other personnel, 
and property; 
(2) The rights and obligations of United States 
Army personnel if captured, detained, or retained; 
(3) The requirements of customary and conven- 
tional law pertaining to  captured, detained, or retained 
personnel, property, and civilians; 
(4) The probable results of acts of violence against, 
and inhuman treatment of, personnel; 
( 5 )  Illegal orders; 
(6) Rules of Engagement; and 
(7) The procedures for reporting war crimes.102 
The current methodology for teaching the law of war 
attempts to tailor the training to  the particular type of military 
unit. Special Forces units, for example, not only receive constant 
classroom instruction on the law of war, but also must answer 
difficult law of war questions. These questions deal with 
situations that could arise during special operations and are 
incorporated in their training missions.103 The much-reported 
incident of the Gulf War, in which a Special Forces “ A  team had 
to choose between killing an Iraqi girl or risk being discovered, 
actually was a well-trained scenario which, in the real world, 
1 0 2 D ~ ~ ’ ~  OF ARMY, REG. 350-216, TRAININGTHE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 
1949 AND HAGUE No. IV OF 1907, para. 5a (7 Mar. 1975); see Elliott, supra note 
95, a t  33. 
‘03See Gary L. Walsh, Role of the Judge Advocate in  Special Operations, 
ARMY LAW., Aug. 1989, a t  6-8; Jeffrey F. Addicott, Developing a Security Strategy 
for Indochina, 128 MIL. L. REV. 35 (1990). 
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resulted in a correct application of a very difficult law of war 
is sue. 104 
The one thread that runs throughout the complex web of 
ensuring compliance with the law of war is the role of the judge 
advocate. To ensure that American forces comply with all aspects 
of the law of war, the Army has expanded its use of military 
attorneys dramatically.105 For example, all combat forces have an 
“operational law”106 attorney assigned at the division level. This 
judge advocate advises operational commanders on decision- 
making and training to  ensure that their units comply with and 
adhere to  the law of war. The operational law advisor also 
examines the full range of international and domestic law that 
impacts “specifically upon legal issues associated with the 
planning for and deployment of U.S. forces overseas in both 
peacetime and combat environments.”107 This is a major change 
from the role of judge advocate in Vietnam-a role primarily 
delegated to  the administration of military justice. 
Currently, the function of the judge advocate can be divided 
into two elements: a preventive role and an active role. In the 
preventive role, the judge advocate advises commanders on 
potential issues dealing with rules of engagement, targeting, and 
all other relevant aspects of the law of war. In addition, the judge 
advocate is involved deeply in providing actual law of war 
instruction and training to soldiers within his or her particular 
command. 
104Douglas Waller, Secret Warriors, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1991, a t  20. Each 
Special Forces group has a military attorney assigned as  the group judge 
advocate. Part of the function of this officer is to deal with operational law issues 
associated with special operations. 
’“See, e.g., James A. Burger, International Law-The Role of the Legal 
Advisor, and Law of War Instruction, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1978, a t  22; William H. 
Parks, The Law of War Advisor, 31 JAG J .  1 (1980). 
“‘See David E. Graham, Operational Law (0PLAW)-A Concept Comes of 
Age, ARMY LAW., July 1987, a t  9. 
‘070ne major effort to prepare operational law attorneys was the 
establishment of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) by then- 
Secretary of the Army, John 0. Marsh Jr. ,  in December of 1988. The CLAMO is 
located a t  The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, in Charlottesville, 
Virginia. The goal of the CLAMO is to examine both current and potential legal 
issues attendant to  military operations through the use of professional exchanges 
such as symposia, consultations, and advice; writing, reviewing, editing, 
commenting on, and publishing reports, treatises, articles, and other written 
materials; and ensuring access to a well-stocked joint service operational law 
library. The CLAMO serves as a source for, guide to, and clearinghouse of, 
information about operational law and national security law. See Jeffrey F. 
Addicott, Operational Law Note: Proceedings of the First Center for Law and 
Military Operations Symposium, 18 to 20 April 1990, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1990, a t  
47-57. 
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In the active role, the judge advocate is involved in the 
investigation of allegations of law of war violations. The 
requirement to investigate is either carried out directly by the 
legal officer or is monitored closely by the judge advocate.108 
Finally, the judge advocate will be called upon to either prosecute 
or defend individuals who have been charged with law of war 
violations. 
C. Officers Must Ensure Compliance with the Law of War 
Through Training and Leadership 
As implied throughout this article, the importance of 
professional conduct on the battlefield extends to the strategic, 
political, and social realms. The primary responsibility for 
ensuring this professional conduct falls directly on the officer 
corps. For this reason, nowhere is the need for law of war training 
more critical than in the proper development of the military’s 
officer corps. No officer should be given the responsibility of 
leadership unless he or she possesses two essential qualities: (1) 
technical proficiency in the profession of arms; and (2) the highest 
ethical and moral courage. Under the ancient Roman adage that 
no man can control others until he first can control himself, 
officers must be prepared and tested thoroughly in both of these 
areas. Combat command should be offered only to officers who 
thoroughly have been scrutinized and put through extensive field 
training exercises designed to test combat pressures. 
The primary cause of My Lai unquestionably was the lack of 
disciplined control-in other words, the lack of any real 
leadership. Leadership is absolutely essential in preventing law of 
war violations. The associated tensions set out by the Peers 
Report were not the real problem a t  My Lai; tensions of combat 
always will be present in one form or another. The real problem 
was that the leaders failed to control those tensions effectively. A 
soldier facing the stresses of war cannot be expected to temper his 
actions solely by exercising the level of restraint that commonly is 
considered self-control. Rather, ensuring that soldiers know how 
to-and actually are capable of-maintaining self-control under 
warfighting pressures depends considerably on a commander’s 
training and leadership. Sadly, many of the officers in Charlie 
Company not only allowed the illegal manifestations of battlefield 
l o 8 D ~ ~ ’ ~  OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (July 
1979); Memorandum, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MJCS 0124-88, subject: 
Implementation of DOD Law of War Program, (4 Aug. 1988); UNITED STATES 
CENTRAL COMMAND, CENTCOM REG. 27-1, LEGAL SERVICES: LAW OF WAR 
PROGRAM (3 Jan. 1989); UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND, CENTCOM REG. 
27-25, REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION OF ALLEGED WAR CRIMES (3 Jan. 1989). 
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stress t o  be exhibited by their troops, but also initiated and 
participated actively in the atrocities-both through the orders 
they gave and examples they set. Proper officer leadership 
undoubtedly could have prevented the law of war violations at My 
Lai. Accordingly, the primary responsibility for these crimes lay 
with those officers. The function of leadership is to hold up, at all 
times and at all costs, the professional torch. The officers involved 
in the incident at  My Lai, however, did not merely allow that 
torch to fall; instead, they actually extinguished its flame before 
those who depended upon it for enlightenment and guidance. 
V. Conclusion 
Future My Lai’s cannot be prevented unless the answers t o  
the “why?” of My Lai are repeated over and over-that is, until 
they are inculcated into every warfighter in uniform. Just as 
Americans must never forget their rallying cries of honor and 
nobility-“Remember the Alamo”log-they must be forced to  deal 
with their nightmares-“Remember My Lai.” On the other hand, 
precisely because of its horror and repulsiveness, My Lai is suited 
uniquely to serve as the primary vehicle to address the entire 
issue of adherence to the law of war, as well as the necessity for 
effective leadership in the modern era characterized by low 
intensity conflict environments. 
The American military cannot afford to take these lessons 
lightly. Not surprisingly, with the passing of time, many lessons 
of history will be forgotten and therefore, many mistakes will be 
repeated.110 This human reality is particularly unfortunate in 
light of humanity’s continuing efforts at  curtailing warfare. 
Accordingly, the lessons of My Lai not only must be remembered, 
but also must be inculcated. 
‘”See LON TINKLE, THE ALAMO (1958). For 13 days in March of 1836, 187 
Americans fought off a Mexican Army that outnumbered them by thirty t o  one. 
The battle took place a t  the Alamo a t  San Antonio, Texas. Although all of the 
Americans could have escaped, they choose to  fulfill their duties, even knowing 
that doing so would mean almost certain death. All died in combat-killing 1600 
Mexicans in the process-to buy time for the birth of the Texas Republic. The 
subsequent battle cry of “Remember the Alamo,” was coined by General Sam 
Houston in the defeat of the same Mexican forces later that year. 
”‘Many military writers have lamented that basic historical lessons related 
to combat are not emphasized, even a t  the nation’s military academies. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey Record, Our Academies Don’t Teach The History of War, HARPER’S MAG., 
Apr. 1980, a t  26; Jay Luvaas, Military History: Is  it Still Practicable?, 
PARAMETERS, Mar. 1982, a t  2; T. N. Dupuy, Practical Value Largely 
Unappreciated, History and Modern Battle, ARMY, Nov. 1982, a t  18; Jeffrey F. 
Addicott, The United States of America: Champion of the New World Order or the 
Rule of Law?, 6 FLA. J. INT’L L. 63 (1990). 
